Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss, allows a semi-trusted proxy to convert a ciphertext originally intended for Alice into an encryption of the same message intended for Bob. Proxy re-encryption has found many practical applications, such as encrypted email forwarding, secure distributed file systems, and outsourced filtering of encrypted spam. In ACM CCS'07, Canetti and Hohenberger presented a bidirectional PRE scheme with chosen-ciphertext security, and left an important open problem to construct a chosen-ciphertext secure proxy reencryption scheme without pairings. In this paper, we propose a bidirectional PRE scheme with chosen-ciphertext security. The proposed scheme is fairly efficient due to two distinguished features: (i) it does not use the costly bilinear pairings; (ii) the computational cost and the ciphertext length decrease with re-encryption.
Introduction

Background
Imagine that one day you are on vacation and is inconvenient to access your email. You would wish to have the mail server forward your encrypted email messages to your colleague Bob, who can then read the them using his own private key. A naive way is to have the mail server store your private key and act as follows: when an encrypted email message for you arrives, the mail server decrypts it using the stored private key and re-encrypts the plaintext using Bob's public key. However, such a solution is highly undesirable, especially in the case that the email server is untrustworthy, since the server learns both the plaintext and your private key.
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [4] , is a novel solution to the above scenario. In a PRE system, a proxy is given a re-encryption key rk i,j so that it can convert a ciphertext under public key pk i into a ciphertext of the same plaintext under a different public key pk j . The proxy, however, learns nothing about the plaintext under either key. Now, as to the aforementioned scenario, you can have the email server act as a proxy, and give it the re-encryption key instead of your private key. Then the email server translates encrypted email messages intended to you into those encrypted under Bob's public key, without learning the content of the email messages. Proxy re-encryptions find many other practical applications, such as distributed file systems, outsourced filtering of encrypted spam, and access control over network storage [1, 2, 21] .
Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [4] categorized two types of PRE schemes. If the reencryption key rk i,j allows the proxy to convert ciphertexts under pk i into ciphertexts under pk j and vice versa, then the scheme is called bidirectional. If rk i,j allows the proxy to convert only from pk i to pk j , then the scheme is called unidirectional. Blaze et al. [4] proposed the first bidirectional PRE scheme in 1998. In 2005, Ateniese et al. [1, 2] presented a unidirectional PRE scheme based on bilinear pairings. Both of these schemes are only secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). However, applications often require security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA).
To fill this gap, Canetti and Hohenberger [8] presented an elegant construction of CCA-secure bidirectional PRE scheme. Later, Libert and Vergnaud [18] presented a unidirectional PRE scheme with replayable chosen-ciphertext (RCCA) security. Both of these constructions rely on bilinear pairings. In spite of the recent advances in implementation technique, compared with standard operations such as modular exponentiation in finite fields [6] , the pairing computation is still considered as a very expensive operation. It would be desirable for cryptosystems to be constructed without relying on pairings, especially in computation resource limited settings. In view of this, Canetti and Hohenberger left an important open problem in [8] , i.e., how to construct a CCA-secure proxy re-encryption scheme without pairings.
Our Contributions
In this paper, we first circumvent several obstacles and construct a bidirectional PRE scheme without pairings 1 . Based on the modified computational Diffie-Hellman (mCDH) problem, we prove its CCA security in the random oracle model. Compared with existing CCA-secure bidirectional proxy re-encryption schemes, our scheme is much more efficient due to the following facts: (i) our scheme does not use the costly bilinear pairing; (ii) the computational cost and the ciphertext length in our scheme decrease with re-encryption. In contrast, the existing CCA-secure bidirectional PRE schemes cannot share these desirable features.
Related Works
Boneh, Goh and Matsuo [5] described a hybrid proxy re-encryption system based on the ElGamal-type public key encryption system [11] and Boneh-Boyen's identity-based encryption system [3] . Recently, Libert and Vergnaud [20] proposed a traceable proxy reencryption system, in which a proxy that leaks its re-encryption key can be identified by the delegator. Proxy re-encryption has also been studied in identity-based settings [9, 13] .
Another kind of cryptosystems related to proxy re-encryption is the proxy encryption cryptosystem [10, 15, 22] . In NDSS'03, Dodis and Ivan [10] presented generic constructions of proxy encryption schemes as well as several efficient concrete schemes. It should be noted that, as argued in [8, 18] , proxy re-encryption schemes are a (strict) subset of proxy encryption schemes. In proxy encryption systems, a delegator allows a delegatee to decrypt ciphertexts intended for her with the help of a proxy by providing them with shares of her private key. This approach requires the delegatee to store an additional secret for each delegation. In contrast, the delegatee in proxy re-encryption schemes only needs to have its own decryption key.
Proxy re-encryption should not be confused with the universal re-encryption [14] , in which the ciphertexts are re-randomized instead of changing the underlying public key.
Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the model of PRE systems and some complexity assumptions related to our proposed schemes. In Section 3, we propose a bidirectional PRE scheme without pairings, and give a comparison between our scheme and other existing bidirectional PRE schemes. We also prove the CCAsecurity of our bidirectional PRE scheme. In Section ??, based on our bidirectional PRE scheme, we further propose a unidirectional PRE scheme without parings, and then prove its security. Finally, Section 4 lists some open problems and concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
Notations
We first present some notations used in the rest of this paper. For a prime q, let Z q denote the set {0, 1, 2, · · · , q − 1}, and Z * q denote Z q \{0}. For a finite set S, x $ ← S means choosing an element x from S with a uniform distribution.
Model of Proxy Re-Encryption Systems
In this subsection, we review the definitions and security models for bidirectional and unidirectional proxy re-encryption systems.
Formally, a bidirectional PRE scheme consists of the following six algorithms [8] :
The global setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter κ. It outputs the global parameters param.
For brevity, we assume that param is implicitly included in the input of the following algorithms.
Roughly speaking, the correctness requires that, for any m ∈ M and any couple of public/private key pairs (pk i , sk i ), (pk j , sk j ), the following conditions hold:
Remark 1. A proxy re-encryption scheme is said to be multi-hop, if a ciphertext can be consecutively re-encrypted, i.e., it can be re-encrypted from pk 1 to pk 2 and then to pk 3 and so on. In contrast, a proxy re-encryption scheme is said to be single-hop, if a re-encrypted ciphertext can not be further re-encrypted. In this paper, we concentrate on single-hop proxy re-encryption schemes. Besides, for consistency and easy explanation, we adopt a term as used in [18] : the original ciphertext is called the second-level ciphertext, while the re-encrypted ciphertext is called the first-level ciphertext.
Next, we review the security notion for PRE systems. This security notions is derived from [8, 18] , with slight modifications to allow the adaptive corruptions of users. The chosen-ciphertext security for a bidirectional PRE scheme Π can be defined via the following game between an adversary A and a challenger C:
Setup. C takes a security parameter κ and runs algorithm GlobalSetup. It gives A the resulting global parameters param.
Phase 1.
A adaptively issues queries q 1 , · · · , q m where query q i is one of the following:
• Uncorrupted key generation query i : C first runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public/private key pair (pk i , sk i ), and then sends pk i to A.
• Corrupted key generation query j : C first runs algorithm KeyGen to obtain a public/private key pair (pk j , sk j ), and then gives (pk j , sk j ) to A.
• Re-encryption key generation query pk i , pk j : C first runs ReKeyGen(sk i , sk j ) to generate a re-encryption key rk i,j . Then C returns rk i,j to A. Here sk i and sk j are private keys with respect to pk i and pk j respectively. It is required that pk i and pk j were generated beforehand by algorithm KeyGen. As argued in [8] , it is required that either both pk i and pk j are corrupted, or alternately both are uncorrupted.
• Re-encryption query pk i , pk j , CT i : C first runs algorithm ReKeyGen to generate the re-encryption key rk i,j . Then it runs ReEncrypt(rk i,j , CT i ) to obtain the resulting ciphertext CT j , which is returned to A. It is required that pk i and pk j were generated beforehand by KeyGen.
• Decryption query pk, CT : Challenger C returns the result of Decrypt(sk, CT)
to A, where sk is the private key with respect to pk. It is required that pk was generated beforehand by KeyGen.
Challenge. Once A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal-length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 ∈ M and a target public key pk i * which is generated by the uncorrupted key generation query i * . Challenger C flips a random coin δ ∈ {0, 1}, and sets the challenge ciphertext to be CT * = Encrypt(pk i * , m δ ), which is sent to A.
Phase 2.
A issues additional queries q m+1 , · · · , q max where each of the queries is one of the following:
• Uncorrupted key generation query i : C responds as in Phase 1.
• Corrupted key generation query j : C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that pk j = pk i * . Besides, if A has obtained a derivative 2 (pk , CT ) of (pk i * , CT * ), it is required that pk j = pk . • Re-encryption key generation query pk i , pk j : Challenger C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that, if A has obtained the private key sk j with respect to pk j , A can not issue the re-encryption key generation query on pk i * , pk j nor pk j , pk i * .
• Re-encryption query pk i , pk j , CT i : Challenger C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that, if A has obtained the private key sk j with respect to pk j , then (pk i , CT i ) can not be a derivative of (pk i * , CT * ).
• Decryption query pk, CT : Challenger C responds as in Phase 1. Here it is required that, (pk, CT) can not be a derivative of (pk i * , CT * ).
Guess. Finally, A outputs a guess δ ∈ {0, 1}.
We refer to adversary A as an IND-PRE-CCA adversary, and we define his advantage in attacking scheme Π as
where the probability is taken over the random coins consumed by the challenger and the adversary. Note that the chosen plaintext security for a PRE scheme can be similarly defined as the above game except that the adversary is not allowed to issue any decryption queries. 
Complexity Assumptions
In this subsection, we review some related complexity assumptions which are used in the security proofs for our schemes. The security of our scheme is based on a variant of the CDH problem named modified computational Diffie-Hellman (mCDH) problem, which has been recently used to construct multi-use unidirectional proxy re-signatures [19] .
Definition 2 Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group with prime order
2 Derivative of (pki * , CT * ) is inductively defined in [8] as below: 1. (pki * , CT * ) is a derivative of itself; 2. If (pk, CT) is a derivative of (pki * , CT * ) and (pk , CT ) is a derivative of (pk, CT), then (pk , CT ) is a derivative of (pki * , CT * ). 3. If A has issued a re-encryption query pk, pk , CT and obtained the resulting re-encryption ciphertext CT , then (pk , CT ) is a derivative of (pk, CT). 4. If A has issued a re-encryption key generation query pk, pk or pk , pk to obtain the re-encryption key rk, and CT = ReEncrypt(rk, CT), then (pk , CT ) is a derivative of (pk, CT).
Definition 3 For a polynomial-time adversary B, we define his advantage in solving the mCDH problem in group G as
where the probability is taken over the randomly choices of a, b and the random bits consumed by B. We say that the (t, )-mCDH assumption holds in group G if no t-time adversary B has advantage at least in solving the mCDH problem in group G.
Proposed Scheme
In this section, we first describe the main idea of our bidirectional PRE scheme, and then propose the concrete construction. A comparison between our scheme and other bidirectional PRE schemes is also given in this section.
Main Idea
The idea behind our construction begins with the CCA-secure "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme [6, 11, 12] given in Figure 1 . It is important to note that, in the ciphertext
, the public key pk is embedded in the hash function H 2 and masked by (m ω). This frustrates the proxy to re-encrypt the ciphertext, and hence this original scheme can not be directly used for our PRE scheme. To circumvent this obstacle, we slightly modify the scheme as shown in Figure 2 (see the bolded parts). Now, the ciphertext component F does not involve the public key, and the ciphertext component E = pk r = g xr can be successfully re-encrypted into another ciphertext component E = E y x = g yr (under the public key pk = g y ) using the re-encryption key rk x,y = y x .
Setup(κ):
Encrypt(pk, m):
The massage space is M = {0, 1} l 0 .
Figure 1: CCA-secure "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme
Else return ⊥ Figure 2 : Modified CCA-secure "hashed" ElGamal encryption scheme Indeed, the modified scheme can achieve the chosen-ciphertext security as a traditional public key encryption. However, it does not satisfy the chosen-ciphertext security for proxy re-encryptions. To explain more clearly, let's take the following attack as an example:
Suppose A is given a challenged ciphertext under a target public key 
Next, he issues a corrupted key generation query to obtain a public/private key pair (pk , sk ) = (g y , y), and then issues a re-encryption query to obtain a re-encrypt ciphertext, say
under the public key pk = g y . Finally, using the private key sk = y, A can recover
and eventually obtain the bit δ. Note that according to the constraints described in the IND-PRE-CCA game, it is legal for A to issue the above queries. As a consequence, he wins the IND-PRE-CCA game.
The above attack succeeds due to the fact that, the validity of second-level ciphertexts can only be checked by the decryptor, not any other parties including the proxy. So, to achieve the IND-PRE-CCA security for a PRE scheme, the proxy must be able to check the validity of second-level ciphertexts. Furthermore, since a PRE scheme requires the proxy to re-encrypt ciphertexts without seeing the plaintexts, the validity of secondlevel ciphertexts must be publicly verifiable. It is worth noting that, it is non-trivial to construct a CCA-secure PRE scheme with public verifiability and yet without pairings, e.g., the existing CCA-secure PRE schemes achieve the public verifiability by resorting to bilinear pairings.
In this paper, we achieve this goal by resorting to the Schnorr signature scheme [23] , which is given in Figure 3 . Note that it is non-trivial to incorporate the Schnorr signature scheme into the modified ElGamal encryption scheme to obtain a secure PRE scheme. One may think that, it can be done by choosing a signing/verification key pair (vk s , sk s ), signing the ciphertext CT to obtain a signature σ, and publishing (vk s , CT, σ) as the final ciphertext. Unfortunately, this does not work, since the adversary can still harmfully maul the above ciphertext. Namely, he can choose another signing/verification key pair to sign the ciphertext component CT, and then obtain another valid ciphertext. The problem lies in the loose integration between the ciphertext component CT and the signature σ.
Sign(sk, m): Verify(pk, (e, s), m): We here briefly explain how to tightly integrate the Schnorr signature scheme with the modified ElGamal encryption scheme to obtain our PRE scheme. To do so, we first slightly modify the Schnorr signature scheme as shown in Figure 4 (see the bolded parts). Next, given the ciphertext components (E, F ) = (pk r , H 2 (g r ) ⊕ (m ω)), to tightly integrate (E, F ) with the Schnorr signature, we generate the Schnorr signature as follows: Viewing F as the message to be signed, and (E, r) = (pk r , r) as the verification/signing key pair (here the base pk in pk r is similarly viewed as the base g in g x ), we pick u $ ← Z * q and output the signature as (D, s) = (pk u , u + rH 3 (D, E, F ) ). The final ciphertext is (D, E, F, s) .
Sign(sk, m): /x i , F ) as the re-encrypted ciphertext (here x j /x i is the re-encryption key). At first glance, this solution appears to be successful. Unfortunately, this is not true, since there exists a simple attack 3 : given a challenged ciphertext CT i = (D, E, F, s) under a target public key pk i , the adversary A simply views (E, F ) as a re-encrypted ciphertext under pk i , and issues a decryption query on pk i , (E, F ) . Note that according to the IND-PRE-CCA game, it is legal for A to issue this decryption query, since (pk i , (E, F )) is not a derivative of (pk i , CT i ). So, the adversary will be given the plaintext m δ , and hence breaks the challenge δ. The problem behind the above solution is that, the re-encrypted ciphertext has the same form as some components of the original ciphertext, and the decryption policies for them are also identical. Therefore, given an original ciphertext under a public key, the adversary can simply take some components from the original ciphertext and obtain a legal re-encrypted ciphertext under the same public key, and then easily break the chosen-ciphertext security of the scheme.
To resist the above attack, a trivial solution is defining the re-encrypted ciphertext to be CT j = (D, E, F, s, E ) instead of CT j = (E , F ). However, such a solution is not desirable, since it introduces big ciphertext overhead. Below, we give an efficient solution with short re-encrypted ciphertext.
To re-encrypt a ciphertext
the proxy first checks pk s
to ensure the validity of the ciphertext, and
x j )) as the re-encrypted ciphertext. The decryption algorithm for re-encrypted ciphertexts should be accordingly modified. To decrypt the re-encrypted ciphertext CT j = (E , F ), the decryptor with private key x j works as follows:
H 1 (m,ω) holds and ⊥ otherwise. Now, the re-encrypted ciphertext (i.e., (E , F )) and the components (i.e., (E, F )) in the original ciphertext have different forms, and the decryption policies for them are also distinct. However, there still exists an attack mounted by the proxy: given a challenged ciphertext CT i = (D, E, F, s) under public key pk i = x i , a proxy with a re-encrypted key rk i,j =
x j x i )). It can be seen that the resulting (E, F ) can be viewed as a valid re-encrypted ciphertext from pk j to pk i . Then, the proxy issues a decryption query on pk i , (E, F ) and then breaks the challenge. To resist this attack, we modify the computation of r in the encryption algorithm as r = H 1 (m, ω, pk), and the original public key will be implicitly embedded in the re-encrypted ciphertext. We will present the detailed construction of our PRE scheme in the next subsection, and give a formal security proof for the scheme in Section 3.4.
3 This attack also applies to Shao's bidirectional PRE scheme [24] . In Shao's scheme, the original ciphertext is CTi = (A, B, C, D, c, s) , where A = pk A, B, pki, h, (C, D) ). While the re-encrypted ciphertext is CTj = (A , C, D) , where A = pk r j mod p. Note that the components (A, C, D) of CTi has the same form as the re-encrypted ciphertext CTj, and (pki, (A, C, D) ) is not a derivative of (pki, CTi). Therefore, the adversary can break the CCA-security by issuing a decryption query on pki, (A, C, D) .
Construction
We now present the detailed construction of our bidirectional PRE scheme. The proposed scheme consists of the following algorithms:
GlobalSetup(κ): Given a security parameter κ, choose two big primes p and q such that q|p − 1 and the bit-length of q is κ. Let g be a generator of group G, which is a subgroup of Z * q with order q. Besides, choose four hash functions H 1 , H 2 , H 3 and H 4 such that
Here l 0 and l 1 are security parameters, and the message space is {0, 1} l 0 . The global parameters are
KeyGen(i):
To generate the public/private key pair for user i, this key generation algorithm picks a random x i $ ← Z * q , and then sets pk i = g x i and sk i = x i . ReKeyGen(sk i , sk j ): On input two private keys sk i = x i and sk j = x j , this algorithm outputs the bidirectional re-encryption key rk i,j = x j /x i mod q.
Encrypt(pk, m):
On input a public key pk and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} l 0 , this algorithm works as below:
Output the ciphertext CT = (D, E, F, s).
ReEncrypt(rk
, a second-level ciphertext CT i under public key pk i , this algorithm re-encrypts this ciphertext under public key pk j as follows:
Parse CT i as CT i = (D, E, F, s).
Check whether pk
and output the first-level ciphertext CT j = (pk i , E , F ).
Decrypt(CT, sk):
On input a private key sk = x and ciphertext CT, this algorithm works according to two cases:
H 1 (m,ω,g x ) holds and ⊥ otherwise.
• CT is a first-level ciphertext CT = (pk i , E , F ): Recall that we only concentrate on the single-hop scheme, hence pk i should be different from the original public key g x . To decrypt this ciphertext, first compute
holds return m; otherwise return ⊥.
Comparison
In this subsection, we provide a comparison of our scheme with other existing bidirectional PRE schemes. To conduct a fair comparison, we choose Canetti and Hohenberger's PRE schemes [8] , which are also bidirectional and achieve chosen-ciphertext security 4 .
Two PRE schemes are presented in [8] , including one secure in the random oracle model (refereed to as CH Scheme I) and another one secure in the standard model (refereed to as CH Scheme II). Table 1 gives a comparison between our scheme and these two schemes. The comparison results indicate that our scheme is much more efficient than the other two schemes. For example, the encryption in CH Scheme I needs 4 exponentiations, 1 pairing and 1 one-time signature signing, while the encryption in our scheme involves only 3 exponentiations. It's worth pointing out that, the computational cost and the ciphertext size in our scheme decrease with re-encryption, while those in CH Schemes I and II remain unchanged. Note that the computational cost and the ciphertext in some schemes such as [1, 2, 9, 18] increase with re-encryption. Although the ciphertext in our scheme involves less group elements than that in CH Schemes I and II, we do not claim that our ciphertext is shorter than theirs, since their schemes are implemented in the bilinear group which enables shorter representation of a group element. However, the pairings in bilinear group in turn add heavy computational overhead to their schemes. Both our scheme and CH Scheme I are provably secure in the random oracle model, while CH Scheme II is proved secure without random oracles. Note: t p , t e and t me represent the computational cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation and a multiexponentiation respectively, while t s and t v represent the computational cost of a one-time signature signing and verification respectively. |G|, |Z q |, |G e | and |G T | denote the bit-length of an element in groups G, Z q , G e and G T respectively. Here G and Z q denote the groups used in our scheme, while G e and G T are the bilinear groups used in CH scheme I and II, i.e., the bilinear pairing is e : G e × G e → G T . Finally, |pk s | and |σ s | denote the bit length of the one-time signature's public key and a one-time signature respectively. 
Security Analysis
In this subsection, we prove the IND-PRE-CCA security for our scheme in the random oracle model. 
where t e denotes the running time of an exponentiation in G;
• or an attacher who breaks the EUF-CMA security of the Schnorr signature with advantage ν within time t .
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that the Schnorr signature is (t , ν)-EUF-CMA secure for some probability 0 < ν < . Suppose there exists a t-time adversary A who can break the IND-PRE-CCA security of our scheme with advantage − ν. Then we show how to construct an algorithm B which can solve the (t , )-mCDH problem in group G. Suppose B is given as input an mCDH challenge tuple (g, g
s goal is to output g ab . Algorithm B acts as the challenger and plays the IND-PRE-CCA game with adversary A in the following way.
Setup. Algorithm B gives (q, G, g, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 , l 0 , l 1 ) which are initially empty, and responds as below: • Corrupted key generation query j . Algorithm B first picks x j $ ← Z * q and defines pk j = g x j , c j = 1. Next, it adds the tuple (pk j , x j , c j ) to K list and returns (pk j , x j ) to adversary A.
• Re-encryption key generation query pk i , pk j : Recall that according to the definition of IND-PRE-CCA game, it is required that pk i and pk j were generated beforehand, and either both of them are corrupted or alternately both are uncorrupted. Algorithm B first recovers tuples (pk i , x i , c i ) and (pk j , x j , c j ) from K list , and then returns the re-encryption key x j /x i to A.
• Re-encryption query pk i , pk j ,
, then output ⊥. Otherwise, algorithm B responds to this query as follows:
as the first-level ciphertext to A. 
If yes, return m to A. Otherwise, return ⊥.
Challenge. When A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs a target public key pk i * and two equal-length messages m 0 , m 1 ∈ {0, 1} l 0 . Algorithm B responds as follows: 
Phase 2. Adversary A continues to issue the rest of queries as in Phase 1, with the restrictions described in the IND-PRE-CCA game. Algorithm B responds to these queries for A as in Phase 1.
Guess. Eventually, adversary A returns a guess δ ∈ {0, 1} to B. Algorithm B randomly picks a tuple (R, β) from the list H list 2 and outputs R as the solution to the given mCDH instance.
Analysis: Now let's analyze the simulation. The main idea of the analysis is borrowed from [6] . We first evaluate the simulations of the random oracles. From the constructions of H 3 and H 4 , it is clear that the simulations of H 3 and H 4 are perfect. As long as adversary A does not query (m δ , ω * , pk i * ) to H 1 nor g ab to H 2 , where δ and ω * are chosen by B in the Challenge phase, the simulations of H 1 and H 2 are perfect. By AskH * 1 we denote the event that (m δ , ω * ) has been queried to H 1 . Also, by AskH * 2 we denote the event that g ab has been queried to H 2 .
As argued before, the challenged ciphertext provided for A is identically distributed as the real one from the construction. From the description of the simulation, it can be seen that the responses to A's re-encryption key queries are also perfect.
Next, we analyze the simulation of the re-encryption oracle. The responses to adversary A's re-encryption queries are perfect, unless A can submit valid second-level ciphertexts without querying hash function H 1 (denote this event by ReEncErr). However, since H 1 acts as a random oracle and adversary A issues at most q re re-encryption queries, we have
Now, we evaluate the simulation of the decryption oracle. The simulation of the decryption oracle is perfect, with the exception that simulation errors may occur in rejecting some valid ciphertexts. Fortunately, these errors are not significant as shown below: Suppose that (pk, CT), where CT = (D, E, F, s) or CT = (E, F ), has been issued as a valid ciphertext. Even CT is valid, there is a possibility that CT can be produced without querying g r to H 2 , where r = H 1 (m, ω, pk). Let Valid be an event that CT is valid, and let AskH 2 and AskH 1 respectively be events that g r has been queried to H 2 and (m, ω, pk) has been queried to H 1 with respect to (E, F ) = (pk r , H 2 (g r ) ⊕ (m ω)), where r = H 1 (m, ω, pk) This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Conclusions
We presented a new bidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme, and proved its security in the random oracle model. Our proposed scheme is fairly efficient, since it does not rely on the costly bilinear pairings, and its computational cost and ciphertext length decrease with re-encryption. A limitation of our scheme is that its security is proved in the random oracle model. It would be interesting to construct CCA-secure proxy reencryption without parings in the standard model. Another open question is to propose CCA-secure proxy re-encryption scheme with multi-hop and without pairings.
